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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AiVERsE POSSESSION-CLOR OF Trn--DJED COLOR olt TITLX ALTHOUGH
KNOWN NOT TO CoNvEY TirLE-In a suit for trespass the land which the
plaintiff claimed to own was in part occupied by plaintiff's church building
and the adjoining lot was used by the members of the church for hitching
iheir horses and for picnics, etc. Both tracts had been so used by the plaintiff
for twenty-five years or more. The land was conveyed by A to plaintiff,
by deed recorded, describing the land purported to be conveyed. The defendant claimed that the deed did not operate as "color of title" because the
plaintiff knew that the title was not in A and because the deed was executed
after the church had taken possession of the land. Held, one justice dissenting, defendant liable, as the deed to plaintiff was sufficient to corstitute "color
of title." Shutt et al. v. Methodist Episcopal Church (Ky. 19W)), 2r8 S. W.
2020.

In the absence of any express statutory requirement, it is not essential
to the acquisition of title to land actually occupied by adverse possession
that the possession should be held under "color of title.' Probst v. Mission
Board Presb. Ch., 129 U. S. 282; Pearson v. Adams, 129 Ala. 157; Horner
v. Reuter, x52 Ill. io6; Crary v. Goodman, 22 N. Y. 17o. However, the courts
have often included this so-called requirement in the elements of adverse
possession. Eang v. Burnet, ii Pet. 52. It seems, however, that this is due
to a confusion of "claim of title" with "color of title," or to a reference to
the sufficiency of evidence to show that the possession of the claimant was
in fact *adverse. 2 ENc. L. & P. Soz. The mere term itself, adverse posses-.
sion, implies that there must be a "claim of title" by the claimant, else the
holding is not adverse. If this distinction be correct the statements of the "
courts requiring "color of title" seem to be nothing but dicta. However, it
is undoubtedly the rule that one must claim under "color of title" in order
to acquire property by constructive adverse possession. Barr v. Gratz, 4
Wheat. 224; Tracy v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 382; Boynton v. Hodgdon, 59 N. H.
247. But the court held, and rightly it seems, that in the principal case the
adjoining lot was actually in the possession of the plaintiff as it was used during the statutory time for purposes of the church. Aside from this, however,
the claim of defendant is not justifiablt. A deed to confer "color of Ititle"
need not be valid. In fact, it cannot be valid, else a valid title will be passed.
Color of title may be defined as that which in appearance is title, but which
in reality is not title. U. S. v. Casterlin, 164 Fed. 437; Miller v. Clark, 56
Mich. 337; Whitcomb v.,Provost, !o2 Wis. 278. Whenever an instrument
by apt words in form passes what purports to be a title it gives color of title.
Hall v. Law, 2o2 U. S. 466; Green v. Horn, i2 N. Y. S. g3. However, an.
instrument creating an equitable interest does not confer color of title. Faith
v. Yocum, 51 Il. App. 62o. There is a conflict of authority as to whether
the claim must be based on a writing. Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, and North
Carolina have held that a writing is not necessary, while Iowa, Mississippi,
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and Pennsylvania hold that color of title may arise from an act in pais without a writing. As to the necessity of good faith on the part of the claimant
in his "color of title," the better doctrine seems to be in accord with the view
taken by the majority of the court in the principal case; this is, that good
faith is not required. 2 ENc. L. & P. 527; Latta v. Clifford, 47 Fed. 614;
Lee v. O'Quin, IO3 Ga. 355; McCann v. Welch, io6 Wis. 142. Contra: Burns
v. Edwards, 163 Ill. 494; Green v. Kellum, 23 Pa. St. 254, and the cases cited
by the dissenting justice in the principal case on page 1022. Statutes in
some states require the element of good faith in such claims. May v. Sutherlin, 41 Wash. 6og. Furthermore, the court seems to be correct in their
holding that since the plaintiff's possession continued for more than the
statutory period, it is immaterial that the original entry was not made under
the deed. 2 C. J., Sec. 4O, p. 198; Hawkins v. Richmond Cedar Works, i2
N. C. 87; Ege v. Medlar, 82 Pa. St. 98. See also 7 MIcH. L. Rzv. 253; 10
MIcE. L. Rxv. 51; 14 MicH. L. Rzv. 338.
5BANRUItpTcy-Acvs or

BANKRUPTcY-ADMISSION

OF INABILITY TO

PAY

DzBTs, =c.--Under authority from the directors a clerk of a corporation

wrote a letter stating "* * * The only course open to the non-attaching creditors is to bring involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy, and the company
will admit its insolvency, and its willingness to be adjudged bankrupt on that
ground." In involuntary bankruptcy proceedings this was counted upon as
the necessary act of bankruptcy. Held, not sufficient under Bankruptcy Act,
§ 3a (5).. In re StandardShipyard Co. (D. C, Maine, i92o), 262 Fed. 522.
It would seem that since the amendment allowing corporations to become
voluntary bankrupts there would not be much occasion to rely on this act
of bankruptcy. See In re C. Moench & Sons Co., 130 Fed. 685. The provision in § 3a (5) is such that, taking into account the marked disposition of
the courts to require a quite literal compliance therewith, about the only
occasion when a commission of that particular act of bankruptcy could be
shown would be when the proceedings were essentially voluntary. Now that
corporations also are allowed to initiate bankruptcy proceedings, the direct
course would seem ordinarily preferable to the indirect. The principal case
follows In re Baker-Ricketson Co., 97 Fed. 489. When proceedings are based
on § 3a (5) solvency or insolvency is not a material matter. In re McNally
Co., 29 Am. B. R. 772; Matter of Cohn, 227 Fed. 843; In re Dressler Producing Corp., 262 Fed. 257 (1919). Compare Maplecroft Mills v. Childs, 226
Fed. 415, 14 MIcH. L. Rv. 338, where is considered the somewhat analogous
question whether, under the last part of § 3a (4) making it an act of bankruptcy if "because of insolvency a receiver or trustee has been put in charge,"
etc., actual insplvency must be shown. To constitute the act of bankruptcy
under cl. (5), however, there must be an admission in writing of "inability
to pay his debts," As to whether "inability to pay his debts" is equivalent
to "insolvency" as defined in the Bankruptcy Act is a question which may well
be considered. If Congress meant insolvency, why did it not use that word,
one that is used so frequently and has such a well-defined meaning in the Act?

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONSBANKS AND BANKING--LIABILITY ov BANK COLLECTING CO3MERCIAL PAPM
four
V0R AcTS or COPJMSPONDxNT.-The plaintiff deposited for collection,

drafts with bills of lading attached, in the Wisconsin National Bank, at Milwaukee. The same were forwarded to the defendant bank, correspondent
in Ashtabula, Ohio, which bank held them without demanding, payment from
the drawee or making any report, until the corn deteriorated in value, and
the consignee then refused to accept it. The plaintiff consignor sued the
negligent correspondent bank. Held, that the -receiving bank, alone, is liable
to the plaintiff for all the negligence and default of correspondent banks,
since it acts as an independent contractor in making collections and is liable
for the negligence of its agents. Therefore, the defendant correspondent
bank cannot be sued by the plaintiff. Taylor & Bournique Co. v. National
Bank of Ashtabula (D. C., N. D. Ohio, E. D. i9ig), 262 Fed. i68.
The conflict still remains in the law between the so-called "New York
rule" and the "Massachusetts rule" as to the liability of the receiving collecting bank for the negligence and default of its correspondent in collecting
out of town collections. Under the "New York rule," the bank with which
the collections are deposited is liable for the negligence or default of any agents
which it may select for the purpose of collecting such items. Commercial
Bank v. Union Bank, ii N. Y. 203; National Revere Bank v. National Bank
of Republic, 172 N. Y. io2; Martin v. Hibernia Bank, 127 La. 301; Simpson
v. Waldby, 63 Mich. 439; Sagerton Hdw. Co. v. Gammer Co. (Tex. Civ.,
App.), i66 S. W. 428; Pickney v. Kanawha Valley Bank, 68 W. Va. 254;
Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308; Exchange National Bank v. Third National
Bank, 112 U. S. 276. The "Massachusetts rule" holds that where a collecting
bank uses due care in selecting competent and worthy agents, its duty is
don , and such correspondent banks become the agents of the depositor.
Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 330; Lord v. Hingham Nationat
Bank, 186 Mass. 16i; Brown v. People's Savings Bank, 59 Fla. 163; Stacy v.
Dane County Sasings Bank, 12 Wis. 702. For a list of states and the rule
which they follow, see 5 MIcH. L. Rev. 109; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608; 7 C. J.
606-7. In the principal case a situation arose, such that the plaintiff contended that the Wisconsin law prevailed, since the draft was deposited for
collection in Wisconsin, while the defendant claimed that the Ohio law prevailed, since the iollection was to take place in Ohio. Inasmuch as Ohio
follows the "New York rule," Reeves v. State Bank, 8 Oh. St. 466, and Wisconsin the "Massachusetts rule," Stacy v. Dane County Bank, supra, either
of the parties was entitled to judgment if his contention was correct. However, the court held that being a question of general and not local or statute
law, the case would be determined by reference to all the authorities, and
not by the law of the place where the contract was made or where the contract was to be performed. Swift v. Tyson. i6 Pet. i; B. & 0. Ry. v. Bangh,
the
149 U. S. 368. Having determined that the general law would prevail,
case, since it was in the Federal courts, was determined by the rule laid
down in the Supreme Court of the United States, which is the "New York
rule." Lxchange National Bank v. Third National Bank, supra. Inasmuch
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as there is much to be said in favor of the "New York rule," on the ground
of strict agency principles, and of the "Massachusetts rule," on the ground
of banking policy and general business considerations, it is doubtful if the
conflict can ever be settled except by the adoption of a uniform banking
statute by the various states. See also 4 MICH. L. Rzv. 226; 5 MICH. L.
Rev. 1o
B=s AND NOvS-CmAiN o PaomIs.-In an action for judgment on
a promissory note it was shown that the promise was to pay "when the
present indebtedness of Highland Park Co. is paid," and that such indebtedness had not been paid. Held,-the payee could recover. Dille v. Longwell
(Ia., 19i2o), x76 N. W. 619.
The settled rule is that a promissory note must contain an "unconditional"
promise to pay. Josselyn v. Lacier, io Mod. 294, 317; Carlos v. Fancourt, 5
Term. R. 482, "It would perplex the commercial transactions of mankind if
paper securities of this kind were issued out into the world encumbered
with conditions and contingencies, and if the persons to whom they were
offered in negotiation were obliged to enquire when these uncertain events
would probably be reduced to a certainty. * * * The justice of the case is
certainly with the (payee) : but we must not transgress the legal limits of
the law in order to decide according to conscience and equity." Worden v.
Dodge, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 159 (promise. to pay out of proceeds of ore to be
mined, held a conditional promise). This common'law rule of sound policy
INSTRUMENTS AcT, § i, 2,--"must
nezOTh
is embodied in the UNivoas N=
contain an unconditional promise or order to pay." In Devine v. Price, 152
N. Y. S. 321, decided after the adoption of the act, a promise to pay "when
Post Office Department accepts my building" was held to be conditional.
The principal case does not refer to this rule requiring an absolute promise,
but avoids the rule by deciding that the particular promise was unconditional; that a promise to pay "when the thing should be done" was in fact
a promise to pay "when the thing ought to have been done." In so interpreting the'apparent condition as in fact not a condition, the court has much
justification in precedent. To pay "when convenient" has been held to mean
"within a reasonable time." Jones v. Eisler, 3 Kan. 134; Benton v. Benton,
78 Kan. 366; Page v. Cook, 164 Mass. 116. In Randall v. Johnson, 59 Miss.
317, a promise to pay "when a certain vessel should return" was held to mean
"when she should normally have returned." The opinion cites much authority for its decision. The court was obviously influenced by the fact that
the accomplishment of the condition, that is, the payment of the debts, happened to be a duty of the defendant, regardless of the note. These decisions
perhaps accomplish justice between the parties, but inasmuch as they leave
it quite.uncertain whether a literal condition will be treated as such, or will be
judicially "interpreted" as meaning something different, they quite disregard
the reason for the rule, as stated in Carlos v. Fancourt, supra, that the taker
of a note should be able to know at the time whether it will ever be payable.
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will contained several
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bequests to priests for masses
repose of the soul of the testator and certain relatives. The-residue of the
estate was left to a Catholic archbishop in Dublin, Ireland, with a request
that priests in designated- churches in his jurisdiction be procured to say
masses for the soul of the testator and designated relatives. Held, the gifts
to the priests are not trusts but are valid as direct gifts to the donees. .The
,residuary legacy is a charitable trust within the meaning of the California
Civil Code limiting gifts of that character by will. In re Hamilton's Estate
(Cal., ig"o), x86 Pac. 587.
In England, until recently, a trust for the saying of masses was considered as a superstitious use which was illegal and void. Re Egan [xgi], 2
Co.,
Ch. 350; Re Blundell's Trusts, 3o Beav. 365; Atty. Gen. v. Fishmonger's
these
overruling
815,
C.
A.
[gig],
Keane
v.
Bourne
But see
2 Beav. 1x.
cases. See 18 MIcH. L. Rzv. 558. In Ireland trusts for the saying of masses
have been held valid as to immediate masses, but not charitable and invalid
if creating a perpetuity. Reichenbach v. Quin, 21 L. R. In 138; Kehoe v.
see
'Wilson, 7 L. R. Ir. io; Morrow v. M'Conville, Ir. L. R. ii Eq. 326. But
this
In
public).
in
said
be
to
(masses
247
R.
i
L.
[igo6],
Logue
v.
O'Hanlon
country, by what is probably the weight of authority, bequests for masses
are held valid, but on varying grounds. In one class of cases they are upheld
as charitable. Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392 (all poor souls) ; Hoeffler
Appeal,
v. Clogan, V7I Ill. 462; Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass. 426; Rhymer's
93 Pa. 142 (called a religious use). In other cases they are upheld as private trusts or construed as gifts to the donees. Harrison v. Brophy, 59
Kan. ; Moran v. Moran, 1o4 Ia. 216 (said not to be a trust but a valid gift);
6
Sherman v. Baker, 2o R. I. 44 ; Re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal.. 327. Courts
bequests generally regard them as private
such
of
which deny the validity
trusts which are void for lack of a beneficiary. Festorazziv. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 1o4 Ala. 327; McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis. 166; Holland v. Alcock,
io8 N. Y. 32 (abrogated by statute in 1893; see Matter of Morris, 227 N.
if
Y. 141.) In other courts they are regarded as not charitable and invalid
creating a perpetuity. See Irish cases, supra; Re Zeagman, 37 Ont. L. Rep.
Re Len536. The instant case is interesting because in effect it overrules
masses
for
bequest
a
that
held
distinctly
was
it
where
supea,
non's Estate,
was not charitable. The case illustrates two types of bequests for masses
which are given effect on different theories, viz., as a direct gift to the named
beneficiary, and as a charitable trust. The opinion contains an interesting
discussion of the nature and purposes of the mass according to the doctrine
of the Roman Catholic Church, upon which the court bases its conclusion
that a bequest for such purposes is charitable. See further, 14 Ann. Cases
CAsES ON Tnusrs, p.
1025; 65 Am. St. Rep. xig; 4o L. R. A. 717; Scot's
283, note.
CONs TuT0roNAL LAW-INCObm TAX ON SAAmms olt FPD-ERA JuGEs.-The provision of Income Tax Act, Sec. 213, in requiring salaries generally
to be included in gross income returns, specifies salaries of federal judges
CHAnTS---BXQuESTS FOR MASSES CHARiTABL---A
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shall likewise be taxed. Plaintiff, United States District Judge, paid income
tax on his judicial salary, under protest, and sued deputy collector for return
of the tax. United States Constitution, Art. 3,Sec. i, provides compensation of judges of Supreme and inferior courts "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Held, such tax does not violate this constitutional provision. Evans v. Gore (D.C., W, D. Ky., igig), 262 Fed. 55o.
This case presents a very novel question, which seems to be correctly
decided, although there is apparently no decision directly in point. Clearly
this is a general tax on incomes, including the judicial salary, and is not
directed against salaries as such. It merely incidentally falls on salaries,
and so is no diminution within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
The constitutional provision does not exempt federal judges generally from
taxation, and each must bear his share of that burden which the United
States sees fit to impose upon its citizens for its maintenance. To support
this decision we have only to realize that the purpose and practical effect
of the constitutional provision is conserved,-the absolute independence of
the judiciary from the legislative branch of the government is not impaired,
inasmuch as the amount of compensation received by the judges, in the first
instance, is not diminished by the legislature. This tax, being generally on
all incomes, is not such a diminution of judges' salaries as- to bring the
judiciary within reach of the legislative department, nor would it cause any
suspicion of influence that might tend" to shape or warp their decisions. The
amount of income received, in the form of judicial salary, remains the same
throughout, even though part of this income must later be paid back to the
government in -the form of taxes. The judge's claim for salary remains
unimpaired, and he receives a salary the same in amount as prior to this
tax, inasmuch as -the amount of the tax is not deducted from the salary
before it is paid to the judge. The government's claim for taxes, against all
citizens alike, cannot be resisted, in the absence of exemption, even by federal judges. This tax does not render the judiciary subservient to another
branch of the government, but merely to the government itself, which, in
its supreme exercise of sovereignty, has the right to subject all its citizens
to like and equal burdens, duties, and taxes. See contrary view, 13 OPIN.
ATTY. GXN. 16I, and BLACK, TRZATISE ON F.xRAL TAxns, Sec. 16, which
seems to carry little weight since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment
to the Constitution providing "Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived."
CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW-RFERENDUM AS To AMENDIMENTS OF FEDFRAL CoXSTITUTIO.-In November, I918, the people of Ohio adopted an amendment

to the state constitution providing that "The people also reserve to themselves the legislative power of the referendum on the action of the General
Assembly ratifying any proposed amendment .to the Constitution of the
United -States." The legislature of Ohio having voted approval of the
proposed Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment, a petition for referendum
was filed with the secretary of state. Plaintiff thereupon filed a petition
for injunction to restrain the defendant, the secretary of state, from spend-
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ing any public money in the submission of such matter to the vote of the
people Held, a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained. Hawke
v. Smith, Secretary of State (Ohio, igig), 126 N. E. 40o.
In discussing this general question in I8 MICH. L. Rzv. 51, it was said
that two questions were bound to arise in this connection. "Does the language of Article V of the National Constitution make the matter of ratification or rejection of proposed amendments a function of the 'legislature,'
in the usual sense of that word? This, of course, is a federal question, and
until passed on by the United States Supreme Court must be considered as
open. The second questions is: Does the state provision for referendum
cover the reference of acts of the legislature -such as are consummated in
ratifying a proposed amendment? This obviously is a local question, and
the Supreme Court will not examine into the soundness of the conclusion
of the state court. Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565." In view of the amendment to the Ohio constitution above quoted, the second question was not
involved in the principal case. In the Colorado and Michigan cases cited below, it was held that the state provisions for referendum did not extend to
approvals or rejections of proposed amendments. The court concluded that
"legislature" in Art. V of the federal Constitution does not mean the legislative body, thus agreeing with the Washington court in State ex rel. Mullen v.
Howell, 181 Pac. 92o, and disagreeing with the Maine court in Re Opinion of
the Justices, 107- Atl. 673. The Maine case is approved in Prior v. Noland,
(Colo., I92o) 188 Pac. 729. In the principal case the court felt very strongly
the supposed weight of Davis v. Ohio, 241 U. S. 565 (Wanamaker, J., in concurring opinion considered the decision conclusive), entirely misconceiving
what was really involved and decided in that case. See IS MICH. L. Rpv. 52,
et seq., where the character of the question there before the Supreme Court
is pointed out. In Decher v. Secretary of State, (Mich., Apr. io, 192o) the court
avoided this error. In Ex parte Dillon, 262 Fed. 563 (Ig2o), Rudkin, D. J.,
concluded that the principal case was incorrectly decided, saying: "Had the
resolution (of Congress) in this case provided that the amendment should
be ratified by the people of the several states by direct vote, such provision
would be clearly in derogation of the Constitution and void, and what Congress could not do it is needless to say the several states cannot do, because
full power over the matter is conferred upon the former and denied to the
latter"
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION- EDUCATIONAL BONUS LAW VOR A PUBLIC PuRrosr.-The Legislature of Wisconsin provided (chapter 5, Laws' of
1919, Special Session) for a bonus of thirty dollars per month to soldiers,
sailors and nurses who served in the late war with Germany and Austria,
while in regular attendance as a student of any of certain designated institutions. This provision is stated to be in lieu of the soldier's bonus provided
for in chapter 667 of the Laws of igig. The benefits of the act extend to
those who were residents of Wisconsin at the time of their induction into
the service and who, after being discharged, desire to continue their education in any of the public schools and colleges named. The expenses of
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this provision are to be defrayed by a special tax on property and a surtax
on incomes. The constitutionality of the act is assailed upon the ground that
the taxation provided for is for a purpose not public. Held, the purpose of
the tax is public, despite the abandonment of the volunteer system for raising
troops and the resort to compulsory draft. State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson
(Wis., 1920), 176 N. W. 224.

For a discussion of the constitutionality of this question and the similar
question involved in the Soldiers' Bonus Law, see i8 MicH. L. R. 535, and
the cases. there noted. See also State ex rel. State Reclamation Board v.
Clausen, (Wash., i920) 188 Pac. 538.
.. CONsTiTuTIoNAr, LAW-VALIDITY oT EIGHTzNTH AMenD1mNT.-Petitioner
was in custody charged with violation of a provision of the National Prohibition Act of October 28, x919, c. 85, which by the terms thereof was not to be in
force until the date when the Eighteenth Amendment should go into effect.
The offense charged was alleged to have been committed January 17, i92o. In
habeas corpus petitioner claimed release because (I) the Eighteenth Amendment was not in force on date of alleged offense, since the Secretary of
State's proclamation was not issued until January 29, igg, and (2) the
amendment was and is no part of the Constitution. Held, (I) the amendment became operative when the thirty-sixth state ratified, not when the
Secretary of State promulgated same; -(2) the amendment is constitutional
and effective. Bx parte Dillon (D. C., N. D. Cal., ist Div., i9g2); 262
Fed. 563.
In this case Judge Rudkin very shortly disposes of some of the contentions that have been so frequently advanced against the validity of the Prohibition Amendment. As to one phase, see supra, note to Hawke v. Smith.
In the principal case it was argued that an "amendment" "implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect
an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."
Citing Livermore v. Waite, io2 Cal. 118. The court says the Thirteenth
Amendment abolishing slavery would have been invalid on such test, yet it
had never been seriously challenged. On the scope of the power of amendment, see the article by George D. Skinner in i8 MicH. L. Rrv 213. See
also 33 HAv. L. RiV. 223; Ibid, 659; 90 CZNT. L. J. 229. It was further contended in the principal case that the seven-year limitation upon the period
during which the proposed amendment might be ratified made the whole
submission nugatory. This, too, was rejected. If the thirty-sixth state had
voted ratification after the seven years had gone by, a really nice question
might have arisen. No one would now contend that an illegal condition subsequent or void attempt to cut off an estate granted (see such cases as
Brattle Squawe Church v. Grant, 3 Gray, z42) would make ineffective the
whole grant. Yet that is what the contention here amounts to. Of course,
it is unsafe to argue questions of constitutional law and construction on the
basis of decisions in such a field as the law of estates, but if the illegal,
added provision in the grant of an 'estate has no effect upon the validity of
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the main grant, it would seem, a fortiori, to be true that, even though such
a limitation as the one in the submission of the Eighteenth Amendment is
void, the whole submission does not fall therewith.
COURTS-PEND4NCY or ANoTHrR ACTION-AZATZMENT AND RZVIVAL.Plaintiff brought an action in the county court for injuries to his automobile,
sustained in a collision with the defendant's automobile. Defendant later
sued plaintiff in the municipal court for damages sustained in the same collision, and judgment for defendant was rendered in the suit in the municipal
court. Plaintiff filed a bill to restrain the further prosecution of the suit in
the municipal court on the ground that the county court had acquired jurisdiction first. Held, the two suits not being for the same cause of action, the
bill should be dismissed. Gilley v. Jarvis (Vt., 192o), IO9 Atl 41.
The view taken by the court in this case is undoubtedly correct. For a
discussion of this question and contrary decisions, see supra, I8 Mite. L.
RP.V. 42i.
DAmAGZS-BuACH or COVzNANT or SusI.-The grantee of land entered
into a contract for the sale of it; the purchaser from the grantee repudiated
the contract and obtained judgment for an advance payment and costs on
the ground that the title was not marketable. The grantors of the land were
notified, but refeused to defend the suit. In an action against the grantor
for breach of the covenant of seisin it was held that the grantors are liable
to the grantee for the difference between the total purchase price and the
value of the portion of the land to which they had title with interest. As
the suit with the purchaser was not in defense of the title, no damages could
be recovered in respect to it. Hilliker v. Rueger (New York, ig2o), 126 N.
E. Rep. 266.
The rule in England for failure to convey realty is to allow nominal damages merely. Flureauv. Thornhill, 2 W. B. io78; Bain v. Pothergill,7 H. I
Cas. i58. But in the United States the rule is generally the difference between the value of the realty at the time of conveyance and the contract
price. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Vheat. iog; Doherty v. Dolin, 65 Me. 87; Plummer
-. Regdon, 78 Ill. 2-2. Contra, see Hammond v. Hannen, 21 Mich. 374;
Burk v. Serull, 8o Pa. 413; Pumpelly v. Phelps; 4o N. Y. 59; Margraf v.
Muir, 57 N. Y. 155. On general principles, the measure of damages would
be fixed by the bargain-i. e., in case of eviction the value of the property
lost. Under a covenant of seisin the value would be taken at the time of
the conveyance, for it is then the breach occurs. Under the covenant of
quiet enjoyment and warranty the value would be taken at the time of actual
eviction. But owing to the extreme hardship which would result to a remote
grantor the rule has been adopted that in breach of covenants of seisin and
warranty the damages are the consideration paid, with interest and reasonable costs of defending the title. Stoats v. Ten Eycks (N. Y.), 3 Cain. iii;
Pitcher v. Lewingston (N. Y.), 4 Johns. i. See cases cited in TirrANY oT
RzL PROPERTY, Chap. XIX, note 301. Under the ancient warrantiachartae
the value of the land at the time of conveyance, rather than the consideration
paid, was recovered. In a few states the covenant of warranty is consid-
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ered a covenant to indemnify and the value at the time of eviction may be
recovered. Horsford v. Wright (Conn.), Kirby 3; Gore v. Brazier, 3
Mass. 523; Cecconi v. Rodden, 147 Mass. 164; Park v. Bates, 12 Vt. 38!;
Williamson v. Williamson, 7Y Me. 442. When the seisin of part of the property fails the damages are the purchase price, and interest, of the part which
fails. The damages will bear the same proportion to the whole purchase
money that the value of the part to which the title failed bears to the value
of the whole premises. Phillips v. Reichart, I7 Ind. I2o; Norton v. Norton,
439;
io Conn. 422; Bibb v. Freman, 59 Ala. 612; Weber v. Anderson, 73 Ill.
Wright v. Nipple, 92 Ind. 310; Scantlin v. Allison,, 12 Kans. 85; Cornell v.
Jackson.(Mass.), 3 Cush. 5o6; Adkins v. Tonzlinson, 121 Mo. 487; Beaupland
v. McKeen, 28 Pa. St. 124; Partridgev. Hatch, 18 N. H. 494. It is submitted
that the damages awarded in the principal case are on no logical basis;
neither a proportionate part of the consideration nor a proportionate part
of the value at the time of conveyance. The rule is properly stated in Partridge v. Hatch,supra, viz.: "If the title fail to part of the land conveyed the
grantee may recover a sum bearing the ratio to the whole purchase money
with interest, that the value of such part of the land bears to the whole conveyed."
DAMAGMS-MITIGATION-B RAcH o, CoNTRAc.-"A contract for the sale
of'goods by the defendant to the plaintiff provided that delivery should be
required during a period of nine months, and that payment should be made
for each installment within one month of delivery, less 2 3/2 per cent discount." "The plaintiffs failed to make punctual payment for the first installment, and the defendant * * * refused to deliver any more of the goods
under the contract, but offered to deliver the goods at the cofitract price if
the plaintiffs would agree to pay cash at the time of the orders.' Held,
"what is reasonable for a person to do in mitigation of his damages cannot
be a question of law, but must be one of fact inthe circumstances 6f each
particular case." Payzu, Ld., v. Saunders (C. A.) [1919], 2 K. B. 581.
This pronouncement from an authoritative source is refreshing. It means
that we have no magic word by the utterance of which we can settle these
cases, but that in every instance we must satisfy some fairly sensible mena jury-that the plaintiff has done what reasonably might have been expected
of him under all the circumstances to reduce the amount of damages. In
the case of Lawrence v. Porter (1894), 63 Fed. 62, iI C. C. A. 27, it was held
that the offer to sell for cash and not for credit must be accepted because
it was an offer in "mitigation." In the case of Whitmarsh v. Littlefield
(1887), 46 Hun. 418, it was held that a cash offer of a less sum instead of
the first cash offer of a greater sum need not be accepted because it was an
offer in "substitution." This court also said that the second proposition was
one to "abandon the old contract," and therefore it would result in a
"waiver" or any rights under it. In a later federal case on a state of facts
similar to those in Lawrence v. Porrer,stipra, the court decided that this
case was not a precedent because the second offer was "conditional" rather
Campfield v. Sauer (I9II), 189 Fed. 576. On the
than "unconditional'
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basis of these decisions the writer of a note in IOMIcH. I. Rmv. 315 formulated the propositions that the new "offer must be one to mitigate and not
to substitute; it must be unconditional and not conditional, and lastly, must
be without abandonment of waiver." He hazarded further that "A fourth
essential might well be inferred from the whole case, and that is that the
offer must be beneficial in order to make its acceptance necessary." The trouble with all these refinements is that in every case the question is still one
of fact as to which of these two sets of antinomic words applies. Finally,
the writer of the note in 16 Micx. L. RZv. 536 suggests that all these forced
distinctions between words should be abandoned, and that "The sole question should be: Is it reasonable under all the circumstances that the new
offer should be accepted?" This is apparently an anticipation of the conclusion in our instant case.
DowEr IN EQuiTABLE ESTATEs.D's husband during coverture contracted
to purchase land from P and paid $9oo on the contract. The contract was
assigned to X and D did not join in the assignment. In a suit to foteclote
by P, D claims a dower interest as against X in the surplus. Held, D not
entitled to dower in equitable estate not owned by her husband at the time
of his death. Corcorrenv. Sharum (Ark., 1920), 217 S. W. 803.
Prior decisions in Arkansas had established that the general statute providing that a widow should be endowed of all lands whereof her husband
was seised of an estate of inheritance extended the right to dower to equitable as well as legal estates. Kirby v. Vantrece, 26 Ark. 368; Spaulding v.
Haley, ioi Ark. 296. A similar statute has been held to be merely declaratory of the conmon law and that dower would only attach to legal estates.
Will of Prasser, i4o Wis. 92. But the court in a later case decided that h
full equitable title in realty with a right to be immediately clothed with the
legal title is substantially a legal estate within the meaning of the dower
statute. Herley v. Harley, I4O Wis. 282. So zealous indeed are the courts
to extend the right of dower to equitable estates that one court at least has
extended the common law rule without the aid of any statute. Shoemaker
v. Walker, 2 Serg. and R. (Pa.), 554. In some states dower is limited by
statute to the equitable estates of which the husband died seised. Thompson
v. Thompson, I Jones, 430. But in other jurisdictions the same result has
been reached by judicial decision. Heed v. Ford, I6. B. Mon. (Ky.) 114;
Bowie v. Berry, I Md. Ch. Dec. 452; Morse v. Tholsell, 78 Ill. 6oo; McRae
v. McRae, 78 Md. 27o. But see James v. Upton, 96 Va. 296. While the former Arkansas cases may be supported by interpreting the words estates of
inheritance as meaning either in law or in equity, the principal case has read
into the statute a limitation of dower in equitable estates which they refuse
to apply'to dower in legal estates, a doctrine certainly not warranted by thd
words of the" statute.
EqUITABLE PROTECTION OP EASEMENTS-BALANCE OP CoNVrNmNcr-Plaintiff owns a city lot upon which formerly stood an old house in the cellar of
which was an excellent well. Defendant owns an adjoining lot on which is
his residence, which was formerly connected by an underground pipe with
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the well, to the enjoyment of which connection defendant has a right of
easement. Plaintiff, preparatory to building a new house on his lot, tore
down the old house, cut off the pipe line at the boundary of his lot, and
walled up the well to the level of the ground. It does not appear that it
was impossible, or even expensive, to make the improvements without disconnecting the well. Defendant's house is adequately supplied with water by
the city system, but the well furnished superior drinking water. Defendant
began to ,dig across plaintiff's lot to restore the connection. Plaintiff sues
to enjoin this operation. Defendant asserts his easement, claims damages for
its disturbance, and prays for an order requiring plaintiff to restore the connection. Held, defendant entitled to damages for disturbance of his easement, but not entitled to equitable relief, and plaintiff entitled to an injunction against trespass. Wilkins v. Diven (Kans, ig2o), 187 Pac. 665.
This decision is put upon the broad ground that "Easements * * * are
given greater significance in England than in America. * * * It would ill
accord with our ever advancing development and progress to tie us down
too rigidly * * * to old ways and old notions." The authorities cited are
cases holding that, on the facts, there was no easement. This application of
the balance of convenience doctrine is startling. Upon a motion for preliminary injunction, where the court must act on probabilities as to the rights
of the parties, it is quite appropriate that it should consider the hardship
upon the respective parties, and the effect on the public, of giving or refusing
relief. At final hearing, when the rights of the parties have been ascertained, the application of the doctrine is obviously more questionable. The
stock argument for' it is that injunction is not a remedy of right but of
grace. The stock objection is that the denial of specific relief works an
informal condemnation for private use, an objection the force of which
depends upon the wisdom with which the doctrine is applied, for there
clearly are cases where such condemnation is very much to be desired. Reference to the balance of convenience at final hearing is most familiar in
cases of nuisance, and may be considered most appropriate there. Since the
basic rights depend upon a balance of conflicting interests, the law being
one of degree, of live and let live, we may well say that, between the annoyances which one must endure without remedy and those against which one
should be specifically protected, lie intermediate cases where damages, but
damages alone, are appropriate. Outside of this peculiar nuisance group, the
cases are very rare in which protection of ascertained rights has been refused
on the balance of convenience, and these cases have been very strong upon
their facts. See Lynch v. Union Inst., i59 Mass. 394; Hall v. Rood, 40 Mich.
46; Welsh v. Taylor, 5o Hun. 137. The principal case is extreme in its denial
of equitable relief to defendant. But how much more extreme it is in granting to plaintiff an injunction the effect of which is to abet the tort by restraining defendant from the exercise of the privilege of self-help, which is
incident to his easement. In this aspect, the case seems to be wholly without
support in authority and wholly outside the doctrine of "grace." The nearest
analogy to it is the doctrine of equitable waste, which has always been re-
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garded as anomalous, though grounded in, good sense and sound policy. The
principal case cannot be commended for sense or policy unless we assume
that the maintenance of the water connection would prevent, or render very
difficult, the improvement of the plaintiff's land, facts which do not appear
in the report.
EvIvNwc-AnmissroN ny SLNzCE To AcOusATmvE DECLARATIoN AMR
ACCIENT ADMISsIBra.-In action for injuries sustained when struck by defendant's jitney bus it appeared that a bystander, after the accident, had told
defendant he "ought to be strung up by the heels for running into a woman
in that fashion." Defendant made no reply. This was offered in evidence
and objected to. Held, properly admitted as an admission by silence when
circumstances called for a reply, though the declaration of the bystander in
itself, apart from the fact that it was unanswered, tended to influence the
jury, and though not competent as proof of any fact implied in the declaration. Baldarachi et al. v. Leach (Cal., igig), x86 Fac. io6o.
This court laid down as the better rule and the weight of authority on
this question thatwhen any declaration or question is directed to a party
which challenges or suggests a response from one who could truthfully dispute or negative it, such is admissible in evidence, and it is for the jury to
determine, in the light of all the circumstances, whether any significance
attaches to a failure to reply; further, that the weight to be given this evidence depends upon how provocative the situation is to speech and how
significant is the silence. The California Civil Code provides that evidence
may. be given of "an act or declaration of another in the presence and within
the observation of a party and his conduct in relation thereto." The court
in the present case, however, considers this to be merely the legislative statement of a recognized common law rule of evidence. Such a rule is undoubtedly often recognized and followed. See Wicou ox EvmwC, Vol, 2,
§io7i; State v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 6o4; Int. Harvester Co. v. Voboril, 187 Fed.
973; Proctor v. Ry., 154 Mass. 251. It clearly could not be held as a matter
of law that failure to make a response in such case would indicate a sense
of guilt; if admitted at all, the jury must be the sole judges of the significance and weight of such evidence. Further, in the case of State v. hllison,
cited supra, the following qualification of such doctrine is laid down: that
such failure to reply cannot be admitted in evidence "if voluntarily' made
by a stranger, that is, a person not a party to the action, and therefore an
impertinence." The court in the case at hand notices this feature, but nevertheless allows the admission of this evidence. It is difficult to perceive why
the present case would not come squarely within the above prohibition, and
if such be the law, this would appear to be an unwarranted extension of the
doctrine. In fact, the court did show some hesitation, and expressed as its
own opinion that the significance of the defendant's silence was here practically negligible as evidence of an admission. This evidence, it seems, may
well have prejudiced the defendant's rights in the present case. But the
qualification above mentioned appears to be denied in Boyles v. McCowen,
3 N. J. L. 677, and perhaps in other cases, on the ground that it is the non-
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denial which is the essential element, and therefore it is immaterial by whom
the statement is made. Undoubtedly, much may be said for this view. But
from one point of view, at least, it appears rather extreme to require one
to deny or answer every such statement, however impertinent, made by anyone in his presence, or run the risk of having an admission implied against
him therefrom. It is believed that, under the common law rules of evidence,
it is within the power of the court to determine, before allowing the question
to go to the jury at all, whether the occasion and attendant circumstances
are such as reasonably call for an answer from the party. This principle
seems to be recognized, at least, in numerous cases. See Vail v. Strong, io
Vt. 457; Moore v. Smith, x4 S. & R 388; Com. v. Kenney, x2 Metc. 235. But
perhaps this rule is altered by the provision cited above from the California
Code.
INTOxICATING LIQUORS--TRMINATIO-1 OF WAR-WAR-TIME PROHIBITION
AcT.-In an action in equity to enjoin defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from enforcing the pains, penalties, etc., of- the War-time Prohibition
Act, it was held that the act, passed under the war power of Congress, ceased
to be constitutionally effective when the war terminated and demobilization
was completed as a matter of fact, in consequence whereof the war power
of Congress, under which alone legislation in derogation of the constitutional
rights of the states can be enacted. or enforced, likewise ceased. Simon v.
Moore (Mo. D. C., B. D., i9g9), 261 Fed. 638.
The Supreme Court passed upon this same question ten days later, in
Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries and Warehouse Co., S. C. Cas. No. 589; Oct.
Term, 191g, and in Dryfoos et al. v. Edwards, S. C. Cas. No. 6o2, Oct. Term,
i9ig. The Missouri District Court based its decision upon the finding that
the war has been terminated and demobilization completed, and determine
a priori that the Act has become invalid. The Supreme Court says: "The
implied power to enact such a prohibition" must depend upon some actual
emergency or necessity arising out of the war or incident to it; still,. the
power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the (insurgent) forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict and to remedy the evils which have arisen
from its rise and progress." This court points out that the treaty of peace
-has not yet been concluded, that -the railways and other industries are still
under national control by virtue of the war powers, that demobilization is
not complete, and that the act in question was not passed until one month
after the Armistice had been signed. Concluding, it states that it would
require a clear case to justify a court in declaring that such an act, passed
for such a purpose, had ceased to have force because the power of Congress
no longer continued. Beyond a doubt, the Missouri District Court was influenced by the tremendous value of property which faced practical outlawry.
But the Supreme Court, through its exhaustive interpretation of indicative
facts, and upon sound principles of statutory construction, sustained the
validity of the act, and demonstrated fully, although leaving the point to
implication, that the remedy must lie with Congress and not with the courts.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION BY MILiTARY AuT o=Y.-The defendant entered into the possession of certain premises under a three-year lease
dating from June 24, 1915. In May, 1917, the premises were occupied by military authorities acting under the DIEMNSE OV THZ RzALm AcT. They remained in possession during the remainder of the term. The tenant refused
to pay any rent after May, 1917. In an action by the landlord, the court held
that the defendant was liable for the rent and resigned him to his claim for
compensation from the War Losses Commission. Whitehall Court Ltd. v.
Ellinger (Nov., igig), 89 L. J. (K. B.) 126.
The case is clearly distinguishable from eviction by act of the landlord.
It bears some resemblance, however, to an eviction by title paramount, the
legal effect of which is to suspend the rent during the time that the tenant
is deprived of the possession. Marsh v. Butterworth, 4 Mich. 574; George
v. Putney, 4 Cush. 351. But it seems that it has been expressly excluded from
that title. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, §i86c. Total failure of consideration has been given as the reason for the suspension of rent in the case
of eviction by title paramount. Russell v. Fabyan,28 N. Hamp. 543. It would
seem that the same reason ought to apply to the principal case, althbugh an
opposite result is reached. And the same difficulty is to be found in cases
where the tenant has been deprived of possession as a result of condemnation under the power of eminent domain. In these cases, the tenant is generally held liable for the payment of rent. Folts v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210;
but, contra, Barclay v. Picker, 38 Mo. 4,3. The tenant has also been held
liable for rent where there has been a total destruction of the premises.
Ross v. Overton, 3 Call 552. Perhaps an explanation of the principal case
would be that, since the premises were occupied for temporary purposes only,
the lessor still held the reversion, together with the rent which was incident
to it. This would not be true of cases involving eviction by title paramount.
Perhaps the earliest case involving occupation by military authorities is Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, where the tenant was ousted from possession by alien
enemies. It was there held that the tenant was not relieved from his obligation to pay rent. The same result was reached in Pollard v. Shaaffer, I
Dallas 210. Contra, Bayly v. Lawrence, I Bay 499. And see Coogan v. Parker, 2 S. Car. 255, where the landlord was allowed to recover rent on the sole
ground that the tenant had resumed possession. Perhaps the cases resulting
from the Civil War are more closely analogous to the principal case. The
tenants were here compelled to pay rent to the Federal military authorities
on penalty of forfeiture, and the landlords were not allowed to recover the
rent from the tenants after the termination of the war. Harrison v. Myer,
92 U. S. iii; Gates v. Goodloe, 1oi U. S. 6i; Zacharie v. Sproule & Co.,
22 La. 325. Here it is doubtful whether the Federal authorities can properly
be treated as alien enemies.
MARRIAGE-FRAUD JusTIvYING ANNUIXENT.-In an action to annul her
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff relied on the contention that she
had consented to marry the defendant relying on his false and fraudulent
representations that after the civil ceremony there would be a Jewish cere-
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mony, and that the defendant had first postponed and then refused to go
-through with the religious ceremony. Held, plaintiff was induced to enter
into a marriage with the defendant "solely by reason of his false and fraudulent misrepresentations," and that she was entitled to a decree adjudging the
marriage null and void. Rubinson v. Rubinson (Sup. Ct., 192o), 181 N. Y.
S. 28.

Schacter v. Schacter (1g9g), 178 N. Y. S. 212, is a decision apparently
squarely the other way. The Schacter case is discussed supra, p. 243.
MuNIciPAL

CORPORAToNs-CoRpoRATE

FUNCTIONS-LIAIITY

FOR

ToRTs

o1v FRMSN.-Plaintiff's testate died as the proximate result of injuries sustained by being struck by defendant's city fire hose truck, operated negligeritly by defendant's servants. Upon demurrer it was held that plaintiff
could recover. Fowler v. City of Cleveland (Ohio, igig), 126 N. R. 72.
It is well-settled law that when a municipal corporation exercises a purely
goyernmental function no liability attaches to it for its torts. Hill v.
Boston, 122 Mass. 344. This principle is admitted everywhere except in
the admiralty tribunals of the United States. Workman v. New York City;
17y U. S. 552; see 5 MICH. L. Riv. 275. The courts are, nevertheless, not
in accord as to what functions come within the scope of this term. Among
the acts which are almost universally admitted to be public or governmental
are those of its police officers (Lafayktte v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330) ; of its
officers and agents in the maintenance, repairing, or management of a city
hall used for city business (Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466; cf. Little v.
Holyoke, 177 Mass. 114, and W1ilcox v. Rochester, 19o N. Y. 137); of those
engaged in the duty of erecting and maintaining public schools (Hill v.
Boston, supra; Kinnsare v. Chicago, 171 Ill. 332; contra, Higbie v. N. Y.
Board of Education, 122 N. Y. App. Div. 483) ; and of health officers (Webb
v. Detroit Bd. of Health, 116 Mich. 516). Likewise, the prevailing rule is
that municipal corporations are not liable for injuries occasioned by negligence in using or keejing in repair the fire apparatus owned by them. Wilcox v. Chicago, 107 Ill. 334. With this case compare Kies v. Erie, 169 Pa.
St 598. See also the text and cases cited in DzLoN, MuN. CORP. [Sth Ed.],
Sec. 166o. In the instant case the Ohio court expressly overruled its previous holding in Frederick v. Columbus, 58 Oh. St. 538, and, by implication,
the .one in Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 1g Oh. St. ig, on the ground that the act
complained of was purely ministerial. It is believed that Justice Wanamaker,
who concurred in the result only, is correct when he contends that the act
was done in the exercise of a governmental function; and it is submitted
that, while the result reached may be a salutary one from the plaintiff's
viewpoint, the decision is a glaring example of judicial legislation and in
conflict with the well-known principle of stare decisis. See also the note in
17.MICH L. Rv. 503.
iN ToRT AcsioNs.7-Six mining comPARIMS-JN'R Os' D -NDANTS
panies severally caused refuse to be discharged into a stream, thereby injuring the lands of a lower riparian owner, who joined them as defendants in
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an action of trespass on the case. There was no allegation of concert,.collusion, or the pursuit of a common design. Held, on demurrer to the declaration, that no joint liability was shown, and therefore there was a misjoinder
of defendants, and the demurrer was sustained. Farley v. Crystal Coal
Coke Co. (W. Va., 192o), io2 S. E. 265.
This case fully examines the authorities on the question of joint liability,
and concludes that there is no such liability on these facts, going so far as
to expressly overrule a recent prior case which laid down the opposite rule.
Conceding that the court was right on this point, did it follow that the
demurrer must be sustained and the parties compelled to maintain and defend as many separate actions as there were defendants? The common
law required such separate actions. But inasmuch as a single action is much
superior in point of justice and convenience, some modern statutes have
expr-essly authorized the joinder of defendants severally liable, and the rendition of separate judgments for or against each. England, Order i6, rule
4; Michigan, C. L. 191S, Sec. i2366. There is no reason, however, why the
courts should not themselves allow such a joinder, without any statute, under
their inherent power to regulate procedure. If separate actions had been
brought against each tort feasor on the facts shown in the principal case, it
would have been within the discretionary power of the court to order them
consolidated for trial. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285. Why,.
then, should not the court have treated the case as a consolidation of separate actions against the several defendants, and retained it for the verdict
of the jury upon the merits of the case and the apportionment of damages
among those defendants proved to be liable, instead of sustaining the'de.murrer and forcing the case out of court? In Snow v. Rudolph (Tex. Civ.
App.), 131 S. W. 249, where a single cause of action was improperly split
into several actions, the court treated a consolidation of these cases as the
full substantial equivalent of a single action, and this was held on appeal
to have cured the error. It would require no greater exercise of judicial
ingenuity to treat a single action against several tort feasors as the full substantial equivalent of a consolidation of several actions against each, and in
this way judicially permit the same procedural liberalty which the jurisdictions above mentioned have secured through legislation. A still keener appreciation of its bbligation to make rules of procedure strictly subservient
to the broader ends of justice would doubtless justify the court in wholly
abandoning the common law restriction and adopting the statutory rule above
referred to as a general rule of practice.
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Ordinarily, the element of fraud does not make the transaction void, but
merely voidable as between the original parties. This voidable title may be
transformed into a valid one either by subsequent express or implied acquiescence with knowledge of the facts on the part of the one defrauded, or
by a resale to a bona fide purchaser before the transaction is disaffirmed by
the original seller. In order to transfer even a voidable title to the buyer,
there must be a contract of some sort between the original parties. It seems
to be settled that where the misrepresentation is as to some fact other than
the identity of the buyer, a contract comes into existence sufficient for this
purpose. Where the buyer misrepresents his identity, however, a more difficult question is presented. Where such a sale is by correspondence, no title
passes, since there is no meeting of minds, hence no contract, and a resale
to a bona fide purchaser will not give good title as against the original seller.
Cunday v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 464. In such a case, the seller is said
to have two inconsistent intents which he supposes to be identical: one, to
transfer title to the writer of the letter; the other, to transfer it to the bearer
of the name signed thereto. Obviously, there is a meeting of the minds as
to *the first intent, but not as to the second, which is held to be the primary
intent and governs the nature of the transaction. Where the buyer appears
in person, but represents that he is buying as an agent, the rule is the same
and the application is even clearer, since the seller, in that case, could have
but one intent: to contract with the supposed principal. Rodliff v. Dallinger,
141 Mass. i. Where the buyer appears before the seller in person, and purports to contract as a principal, but falsely represents himself to be another
person, the rule seems just as clearly settled that the primary intent is to
contract with the person actually present, thereby conferring a voidable title
so that a subsequent bona fide purchaser will be protected against the original vendor. But few cases have been decided on the point, however, and
no less an authority than Sir Frederick Pollock believes that at least it is a
nice question, despite the present weight of authority. Phillips v. Brooks,
Ltd. [ig], 2 K. B. 243, the most recent case of this type, follows the rule
of Edmunds v. The Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283,
the original case on this question. The sole basis for the decision in that
case was the weight of reason as it appeared to the court, aided and abetted
by a bit of harmless dictum from Cunday v. Lindsay, supra, to the effect
that "where the chattel has come into the hands of the first buyer by a de
facto contract * * * the purchaser will obtain a good title." The court decided
that under the circumstances there was a de facto contract, since the primary intent was to sell to the person present and identified by sight and
hearing, despite the fact that there may have been a secondary and inconsistent intent to transfer title to the bearer of the name. Both of these cases
have been questioned on the ground that apparently they are in conflict with
an old and accepted rule of contracts laid down by Pothier, to the effect that
whenever consideration of the person enters into a contract, any error with
regard to the person destroys the assent of the party misled and consequently annuls the contract. PoTHim, OB, §ig; PozLocx or CoNTmcTs
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[8th ed.], p. 497n; 35 L. QuART. Rev. 288. So far, at least, courts have taken
the view that there is in reality no error in regard to the person in these
cases, and that the misrepresentation as to name is not materially different
from that as to solvency. If it can be said that there is any intent to pass
title to the owner of the name, however, there is certainly error with respect
to the person, and the rule of Pothier would seem to be applicable. See
further, i3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 413, and 24 R. C. L. 317.
SALS--IMPLIED WARRANTY-NgGLiGxNcz-Plaintiff alleged that he had
been poisoned through eating beans from a can purchased by his agent from
a retail grocer, who had brought it from a wholesaler, who had bought it
from defendant, in whose factory it had been canned. The proof showed
that defendant's system of operation in the canning process had been conducted with the highest degree of foresight and care. Held, the case was
properly submitted to the jury. Davis v. Vat Camp Packing Co., (Ia., ig2o)
176 N. W. 382.
, The liability of defendant involves three properly distinct questions of
law: i. Does the law impose upon a manufacturer of food a liability as
warrantor of its absolute wholesomeness even though no warranty is implied in fact. 2. Is a manufacturer liable, as for negligence, in putting out
deleterious food, although he has not in fact been negligent. 3. Can either
of the foregoing obligations be taken advantage of by one who did not himself purchase from the manufacturer. The principal case answers number
one and three in the affirmative, but seems to evade the second by leaving to
the jury the question of whether there was in fact negligence. Many authorities on all three questions are cited. The first and second questions are discussed in I8 MicH. L. RZv. 316. The liability on imposed "warranty" was held
not to run in favor of the remote owner in several cases; Nelson v. Armour
Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352; Tomlinson v. Armour Packing Co., 75 N. J. L. 748;
Roberts v. Atnheuser Bvszch Assn., 2I1 Mass. 449; Praterv. Campbell, 11o Ky.
23; Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 545. But to the-extent
that the "warranty" by manufacturer of food is a liability imposed by law
rather than one consciously, or by reasonable implication, assumed by contract, any "privity of contract" is quite unnecessary, and some recent decisions
so hold. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622; Ward v. Morehead City
Seafood Co., 171 N. C. 33; Catani v. Swcift & Co., 251 Pa. 52; dissenting opinion in Drury v. Armour & Co., (Ark.) 26 S. W. 40. The liability for negligence, whether actual or by fiction of law, can be taken advantage of by a
remote buyer. i8 MicH. L. Rgv. 436; i5 MIcE. L. Rev. 672.
WATERS AND WAv.aCOURSES-WAsTING PFRCOLATING WAms.-The defendant in a suit for injunction against diversion of percolating waters, used
the water as a running supply for his stock, th6 overflow forming a wallow
for his hogs. This user was of such an extent as to cause a spring on the
plaintiff's land, which furnished water for human consumption, to cease
running. Held, such user amounted to waste and was enjoinable. De Bok v.
Doak, (Ia., 192o) 176 N. W. 631.
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The decision adds one more court holding squarely to what may now
fairly be called the American rule which repudiates the established doctrine
that percolating water is the absolute property of the owner of the fee, to be
dealt with as he sees fit, and extends the application of the maxim "Sic utere
tuo uitalienum non laedas" to cases of of this sort. For an interesting series
of notes showing the modem tendency toward the view adopted in the instant
case see 2 MicH. L. Rxv. 403, 3 MIcH. L. REv. 491, 7 MICH. L Rxv. 85, and
16 MIcE. L. Rv. 36.

